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Compulsory Licensing vs. Private
Negotiations in Peer-to-Peer File Sharing
By Michael Botein and
Edward Samuels
eer-to-peer sharing of creative works over the Internet
poses a particularly thorny issue for copyright law.
On the one hand, full copyright liability may seem
inappropriate in such an environment, since it might
inhibit the broad dissemination of creative works promised by the new technology. On the other hand, carte
blanche immunity from copyright liability might erode
the commercial value of creative works.1
In an effort to chart a course between the two unsatisfactory extremes, some commentators have recently
proposed a compulsory license to authorize and regulate
the peer-to-peer distribution of copyrighted works, primarily over the Internet.2 We are sympathetic with the
goals of such a compromise and believe that the issues
need to be fully aired. Nevertheless, we remain skeptical
about the feasibility of implementing such a system. To
this end, we think it worthwhile to take a brief look at
the history of compulsory copyright licenses in a number
of different settings. As will be seen, compulsory licenses
have been less than successful in implementing public
policy goals.
Moreover, the general legal backdrop of the peerto-peer issue has changed dramatically in the last few
years. In June 2005, the US Supreme Court’s decision
in MGM v. Grokster3 made clear that peer-to-peer
transfer of copyrighted material violated the Copyright
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Act in the absence of a copyright license.4 The case
thus increased the importance of negotiations between
intellectual property owners and potential distributors,
thus arguably reducing the potential role of compulsory
copyright and other forms of government intervention.
Even without Grokster’s tilting of the scales toward private negotiations, compulsory copyrights generally have
not functioned very effectively.
To begin with, compulsory licenses are not new to
intellectual property. They have been invoked to resolve
several troublesome technological issues, primarily in
the past quarter century. Some compulsory licenses have
been moderately successful, but their general track
record has been disappointing. At best, these licenses
Continued on page 16
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Compulsory Licensing vs. Private Negotiations
Continued from page 1
should be viewed as interim accommodations to preserve
a balance between the extremes of full and no liability
during periods of technological or other change.5 But such
arrangements are not as successful as, and should yield as
soon as possible to, private systems of compensation.
In traditional economic terms, privately negotiated
contracts simply may be more efficient than governmental intervention. At least in theory, private arrangements
should reflect better the changing realities of the marketplace. Even after 210 years of copyright law in this country
and in the face of new technologies, the marketplace still
best serves the public interest in encouraging both the
creation and dissemination of new works.
As a backdrop for considering a new license in the peerto-peer environment, this article reviews existing compulsory
licenses. We first discuss the audio compulsory licenses:
1. The original compulsory license for mechanical
reproduction of phonorecords, established in the
Copyright Act of 1909 and preserved in § 115 of the
current Act;6
2. The jukebox compulsory license, enacted as § 116 of
the 1976 Copyright Act, and repealed in 1993;7
3. The digital audio home recording royalty, established
in 1992 in chapter 10 of the Copyright Act;8 and
4. The digital performance right in sound recordings
license, established in 1995, set out in § 114 of the
current Copyright Act.9
Because the technology and the economics of the
video market are different from those of the audio market, we will review separately the television compulsory
licenses, primarily focusing upon the cable compulsory
license, adopted as § 111 of the 1976 Copyright Act.10
We also will consider briefly: the public broadcasting
license established in § 118;11 the satellite retransmission
license enacted in 1988, as set forth in § 119;12 and the
local-to-local retransmission license enacted in 1999 as
§ 122 of the current Copyright Act.13
We will conclude by considering other aspects of the
copyright system that should be borne in mind as we contemplate the adoption of yet another compulsory licensing
system.
AU D I O C O M P U L S O RY L I C E N S E S
THE COMPULSORY LICENSE FOR MAKING
AND DISTRIBUTING PHONORECORDS
The most enduring compulsory license is the original
one, adopted in the Copyright Act of 1909. The elaborate
16
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scheme was Congress’s response to the Supreme Court’s
decision in White-Smith v. Apollo14 holding that piano rolls
and, by extension, phonorecords were not “copies” of the
musical works that they recorded. That holding meant
that the creators of phonorecords or other mechanical
reproductions of musical works did not have to pay the
owners of copyrights in the songs that they reproduced.
In 1909, Congress legislatively overruled the WhiteSmith case by providing that the making of phonorecords
or other mechanical versions of songs was subject to
copyright protection. Congress created the phonorecord
compulsory license to protect against the monopolization
of music by the sound recording industry and to assure
that performers would have access to any songs that
they wanted to “cover” by making their own recordings
at a reasonable price.15 The provision has stood the test
of time, increasing from 2 cents per song in 1909 to 9.1
cents per song (or 1.75 cents per minute of playing time)
in 2006.16
The success of this original compulsory license may
have inspired Congress to adopt other compulsory licenses
in the 1976 Copyright Act. But the phonorecord license
arose in a context significantly different from any of the
other compulsory licenses, and particularly the peer-topeer environment. The phonorecord compulsory license
does not involve the pooling of funds, but rather the direct
payment by a user/performer (or the performer’s recording
company) to the owner of copyright in the underlying
musical work (or payments made through the Harry Fox
Agency as a designated intermediary).
The phonorecord license thus is simpler to administer
than the later, more complicated compulsory licensing
schemes. It also tracks more closely the private contract
negotiation that would have occurred in the absence of
the compulsory license.17
At least part of the justification for interfering with
the normal market in musical works was the fact that the
users—the performers and record companies involved in
making new versions of older works—also contributed
creatively to the pool of available versions of songs. This is
not the case in the typical peer-to-peer transaction, which
usually involves the simple multiplication (and potential
displacement) of copies of works that are already available through commercial channels. A different situation
might pertain if file sharing produced a large number of
derivative works through sophisticated digital editing and
manipulation, but this has not been the case to date.18
The story of the first compulsory license, however, is
not finished. As electronic dissemination of musical works
displaces the traditional sale of phonorecords and CDs,
any compulsory license pegged only to the old technology soon would be doomed to failure. In 1995, Congress
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updated § 115 to compensate music copyright owners for
the digital delivery of works authorized under the compulsory license, as well as the sale of old-fashioned phonorecords (defined broadly enough to include CDs).19
THE JUKEBOX COMPULSORY LICENSE
Under the 1909 Act, copyright did not extend to
playing music on jukeboxes because Congress adopted
a specific exception in favor of the jukebox industry.20
Although the exception was potentially justified by the
assumption that jukebox play of music promoted record
sales, this unusual free ride by an industry that made a
lot of money from copyrighted works seemed inconsistent
with the general principles of copyright.
To some extent, the reasoning behind the jukebox
free ride is analogous to the reasoning of some creators
today who choose to make their works available for download without a license or fee; for a new entrant, it may
very well be an excellent form of marketing, ultimately
creating a demand for paid performances, such as bookings
and recordings. In a market-based system, creators are of
course free to make whatever arrangements they want for
the cheap or free distribution of some of their works. We
believe, however, that such a choice should be up to the
individual copyright owners, not imposed across the board
by a compulsory licensing system.
In 1976, Congress responded to this free ride problem
by adopting a compromise: a compulsory license for the
playing of music “by means of coin-operated phonorecord players.”21 The initial fee was set at $8 per jukebox.
Through periodic adjustments, the fees climbed to almost
eight times that amount within a decade.22 In a two-step
set of amendments in 1988 and 1993, Congress replaced
the fees with “negotiated licenses” agreed to by the affected industries.23 The current fees have been negotiated at
$275 for the first jukebox by any particular operator, $55
for the second through 10th jukeboxes, and $48 for each
additional jukebox.24
It would be tempting to suggest that Congress viewed
the compulsory license as a temporary fix and that the shift
to a marketplace alternative was a natural and anticipated
evolution in the treatment of the jukebox industry, from
exception to compulsory license to (relatively) free market. Congress’s action was prompted primarily by concerns
that the jukebox compulsory licensing system violated
US obligations under the Berne Convention, particularly
Article 11(1); this assures copyright owners the exclusive
right in the public performance of their works.25 Perhaps
the more important lesson of this history is to underscore
the international context of the copyright system, which
we will consider later.
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THE DIGITAL AUDIO HOME
RECORDING ROYALTY
Prior to 1992, it was unclear whether the home tape
recording of music was a copyright violation. On the one
hand, manufacturers argued that they were not liable
under the principles applied to video recorders in the
Betamax case;26 and rights against home users were, as a
practical matter, unenforceable. On the other hand, some
arguably distinguishing features made the audio market
different from the video market of 1984. Of particular
importance was the emergence of digital audio tape
(DAT) as a near-perfect method of making copies.
In 1992, in response to the issues raised by the new
digital technologies, Congress passed the Audio Home
Recording Act.27 Among other things, the Audio Home
Recording Act provided for a statutory fee to be charged
on the sale of digital audio recorders (generally 2 percent
of the manufacturer’s or importer’s price, with a minimum
of $1 and a maximum of $8) and digital audio media
(generally 3 percent). The proceeds were to be distributed
to the owners of copyright in music and sound recordings
based upon estimated shares of the market.
The DAT experience might seem to be a good precedent for a peer-to-peer compulsory licensing system, with
fees under the new system based upon the price of MP3
recorders and memory devices. The problem is that the
DAT technology was a non-starter, and today the industry
effectively is dead. The fees never amounted to much
more than $4 million per year, and the aggravation in
collecting and disseminating the funds was disproportionately large.28 Perhaps more than any other, this license has
resulted in “spending dollars to chase dimes.” It is hardly a
model for future legislation.
THE DIGITAL PERFORMANCE RIGHT IN
SOUND RECORDINGS LICENSE
Prior to 1995, though there was an exclusive performance right in the underlying music, there was no
exclusive performance right in sound recordings as such.
In 1995, however, Congress created such a right. It was
limited to the digital performance or transmission of such
works, with lots of exceptions that nullified much of the
potential impact of the new right.29 As part of the package, Congress created a compulsory license that applied to
some non-interactive digital transmission services. Such
a compulsory license might seem relatively easy to set up,
since it involves a relatively finite number of webcasters
who do or could operate their Web sites for profit and
who presumably are in a position to absorb reasonable
performance fees.
17
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After Congress adopted the complicated new right
and incorporated the compulsory license into § 114
of the Copyright Act, observers waited to see how the
compulsory license would work out. Even before any fees
had been collected under the license, however, it became
obvious that the statutory language was unclear. Did it
apply to “streaming audio”? No one knew. By 1998, as
part of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, Congress
revised the language to clear up some of the ambiguities.30
A Copyright Arbitration Royalty Panel was established to
recommend the initial rates for the compulsory license;31
it came up with a proposed rate of 0.14 cents for each song
streamed on an Internet-only webcast, and 0.07 cents for
each song included as part of an AM or FM radio retransmission. After much public discussion and complaint, the
Librarian of Congress adopted a compromise rate of 0.07
cents for each song delivered, whether by AM, FM, or
Internet-only transmission.
Many people thought that the rates were outrageous
and that smaller operators could not afford them. Congress
intervened by passing the Small Webcaster Settlement
Act of 2002.32 Currently, the webcasting royalty rates
are divided into nine categories of digital audio services,
depending upon such factors as whether the service is
commercial or noncommercial. Fees range from as low
as $200 for noncommercial webcasters devoted primarily
to news, talk, and sports to 10 percent of gross proceeds
for such commercial services as XM Satellite Radio and
SIRIUS Satellite Radio.
Since its rocky start, the compulsory license has
begun generating at least a moderate flow of revenue,
reaching as high as $35 million in 2005.33 While the fees
might seem to bode well as a model for a peer-to-peer
compulsory license, the comparison is misleading. Much
of the revenues generated by the new digital performance
right are attributable to commercial satellite radio services
such as XM and SIRIUS. Given the recent merger efforts
of these leading companies, it looks like one or two entities will survive such that a traditional copyright license
on a national level is practicable. By contrast, most peerto-peer exchanges on the Internet will presumably be in
a non-commercial setting where revenues are not likely
to be generated, and funds will not likely be available for
distribution.
V I D E O C O M P U L S O RY L I C E N S E S
THE CABLE COMPULSORY LICENSE
For almost two decades, the broadcast and cable industries fought over whether and how much cable systems
should pay rights holders for cable systems’ retransmission
18
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of programs broadcast by television stations. As a first step
to establish a bargaining advantage, television broadcast
networks and producers sued to establish that cable use
of copyrighted broadcast programming was a copyright
infringement. Partly out of fear of strangling the thenemerging cable industry, the Supreme Court twice flatly
held that this type of use was “passive” in nature and thus
created no liability.34
After the Teleprompter decision, the broadcast and
production interests got the message that no judicial relief
was in sight and turned their attention to the decades-old
congressional fight over cable fees. The result was a compulsory license in § 111 of the 1976 Copyright Revision
Act, which went into effect in 1978. This hideously
complicated provision provided that cable operators could
carry both local and distant broadcast television signals for
a fee mandated by the Act, subject to periodic adjustments
by the Copyright Royalty Tribunal. (Later, upon the
abolition of the Tribunal, Copyright Arbitration Royalty
Panels were appointed by the Librarian of Congress. Most
recently, in November 2004, the panels were themselves
replaced by a new system of Copyright Royalty Judges,
to be phased in gradually.) The fee was based upon the
number of distant signal equivalents (DSEs) that a cable
system imported, counting a distant independent station
as one and a network-affiliated station or educational
station as ¼. The number of DSEs was multiplied by a
figure initially set by Congress and later adjusted by the
Tribunal to establish the percentage of their gross revenues charged for importing distant television signals.35
The revenues collected by the licensing system then were
divided among the copyright owners, after elaborate hearings that typically held up distributions for many years.
The big winners in this process generally were broadcast
programming and sports rightsholders.36
The percentage of gross revenues charged for each
DSE has increased over the years.37 Similarly, the total
gross revenues of cable systems have increased steadily
every year. For example, there was an increase in more
than $20 billion in revenues from the time when the
Copyright Act was first passed to almost $30 billion in
2002. But the total payment under the cable compulsory
license actually has decreased in the past decade. After
peaking near $200 million in 1989, it has gone down to
only about $120 million in the past few years. (In part, this
is offset by an increase in the compulsory licensing fees for
satellite distribution systems under § 119, described later,
which in 2002 amounted to almost $69 million.38)
Why have the royalties under the compulsory license
decreased? Quite simply, cable systems do not import as
many distant signals as in the early days. Today, viewers
are interested not in distant signals but rather in satellite
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networks—free, per-channel, or pay-per-view—for which
cable operators negotiate fees in a free marketplace.
Indeed, cable subscribers today get more than half of
their programming from non-broadcast sources, and the
percentage seems to be increasing steadily.
Even in its infancy, the cable compulsory license
system was implemented against the backdrop of Federal
Communications Commission (FCC) regulations that
severely limited the number of DSEs that a cable system
could import.39 While the FCC long ago repealed the limitation, the § 111 fees effectively continue the cap on distant signals by pricing the importation of a DSE that would
have been barred by the earlier FCC rules at 3.75 percent
of gross revenue.40 Cable operators thus do not view distant signal importation as a useful market strategy.
Broadcasters and cable operators also have fought over
the rebroadcast of local over-the-air channels on cable systems within the same viewing area. Under the FCC’s rules
in the 1970s, cable systems were required to carry local
programming under must-carry rules.41 Presumably, the
local station operators did not lose money by this arrangement: Broadcasters kept their local viewers—by being carried on cable systems—and were able to charge advertisers
for them. Indeed, broadcasters actually may gain viewers
in their local areas, since their signals often do not reach
areas which they theoretically cover because of terrain or
other problems; this is particularly true in urban areas like
New York, where tall buildings block reception by a large
part of the potential audience.
The cable compulsory license did not compensate
significantly for the retransmission of local stations, since
the cable operators were required to carry these signals in
any event, and the local broadcasters wanted it that way.
The DSE figure was based totally upon the importation of
signals from outside the viewing area, however, and not
upon retransmission of local television signals.
Most cable subscribers today watch satellite-delivered
non-broadcast programming, for which the copyright
model is not a compulsory license but rather a negotiated
contract. The broadcasters quickly began to figure out that
the real money was in non-broadcast satellite networks.
With the decrease in carriage of distant signals,
payments under § 111 naturally went down. The statute explicitly requires payments only for signals carried
beyond their normal licensed area, that is, distant signals.42 Congress’s theory quite reasonably seems to have
been that broadcasters benefited from cable carriage of
their signals; if the cable operators had any incentive not
to carry local signals, broadcasters naturally would lose
viewers, and hence advertising revenues, in their home
markets. There was and is no need to impose a compulsory
copyright scheme on local signals. Indeed, in many cases
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broadcasters assist local systems in receiving high-quality
signals by building direct fiberoptic or microwave connections to cable operators.
After the widespread development of satellite cable
channels in the late 1980s, cable operators had a declining
need to import distant signals.43 Since systems do not pay
for local signals, it was inevitable that copyright payments
would fall.
Although beyond the scope of this article, the change
in compulsory copyright’s significance is a good illustration of government’s inability to predict rapid changes
in market forces. In the decade after § 111’s enactment,
market changes reduced its importance significantly.
Although satellite transmission existed at the time of the
1976 Copyright Revision Act, congressional drafters simply did not foresee its effect upon the relevance of signal
importation and hence of a compulsory copyright scheme
oriented around distant signals.
At the same time that § 111 was becoming less relevant, broadcasters and cable operators were moving to a
system of private negotiations. To accommodate the shift,
Congress, in the Cable Television Consumer Protection
and Copyright Act of 1992, provided for “retransmission consent” (RTC) as an alternative to must-carry and
effectively a supplement to § 111 royalties.44 (Section 111
applies to owners of copyright in the individual programs;
RTC extends rights to the broadcasters themselves based
upon their broadcast signal and without regard to the
ownership of any copyrights.)
Effective in 1993, § 325(b)(3) of the Communications
Act allowed broadcasters and rights holders to negotiate
for permission to carry their signals. This approach carries
with it a risk under § 325(b)(4); if a broadcaster is unable
to reach a retransmission consent (RTC) agreement with
a cable operator, it gives up its right to cable carriage
locally under the current version of the must-carry rules.
But broadcasters appear to have sought such arrangements
quite eagerly.
Instead of competing for relatively small slices of the
compulsory copyright pie, after 1993 broadcasters seem to
have preferred using the RTC option to negotiate for compensation. This apparently has not resulted in any purely
financial windfalls. Instead, to the extent that the results
of these negotiations are visible, they seem to reflect an
increased reliance upon a form of barter.
Because the RTC deals are proprietary in nature,
their details are never disclosed. Aside from the contracts’
private nature, cable operators naturally fear that, if they
make a highly favorable deal with one popular local broadcaster, others will demand the same terms. Nevertheless,
discussions with cable industry executives indicate some
broad outlines of RTC agreements.
19
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According to an industry trade association representative,45 RTC deals never include outright monetary
compensation. In the early days of RTC, a few broadcasters demanded cash and met instant rejection.46 Instead,
these arrangements generally involve reciprocal dealings.
For example, it was not an accident that, shortly after
the major broadcast networks shifted to retransmission
consent negotiations, most of them struck industry-wide
cable agreements to create new cable networks with a
network brand, for example, CNBC, MSNBC, FNC. The
broadcasters were eager to expand into new video media,
which resulted in new network-run cable channels. In
some cases, cable operators received favorable terms under
these agreements, for example, carriage rights to both a
broadcast and a cable network for less than the cost of
the former alone. Although cable operators thus were
not responsible for copyright payments to local stations,
in effect there was a negotiated agreement between the
industries to transfer value. As discussed below, this probably was much more effective than the type of governmentally mandated payment scheme for distant signals.
The key to these transactions was that the cable
industry could give the networks something more valuable than small cash payments, that is, national coverage.
(In some cases, these arrangements also exist between
cable operators and strong non-network group-owned
stations.) Cable operators claim that they do not agree to
or continue to carry cable networks with little audience
interest. And some networks have had little success in
launching new cable networks, even with the help of RTC
agreements.
The general counsel at a major cable company indicated that other types of deals also are customary.47 Since
systems generally have excess advertising time on cable
satellite channels, they often give or sell it at nominal
rates to local network affiliates for running promotional
material for upcoming network programs. Alternatively,
an RTC agreement may commit cable operators to buy
promotional time from local stations, at relatively low
rates. Or broadcasters and cable operators may agree to
share unused production time in their studios for nominal
payments.
This combination of carrying broadcasters’ cable
networks, giving excess advertising time to broadcasters,
and sharing production capacity may or may not have
real economic value. As the cable general counsel noted,
“It’s the principle rather than the economic value. No
one wants to admit paying cash. There would be network
carriage and advertising agreements in any event, but the
existence of RTC encourages and increases it.”
While the compulsory licensing system may have
represented an unhappy truce in the 1970s, it has been
20
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replaced to a large extent by negotiated agreements
between the broadcasters and owners of programming and
the cable as well as satellite operators who control access
to most viewers. Like the jukebox compulsory license
that eventually yielded to industry negotiations, perhaps
the best compulsory licenses are the ones that fade away,
which § 111 basically began to do after its first decade.
THE OTHER TELEVISION
COMPULSORY LICENSES
The Satellite Home Viewer Act of 1994 created a
compulsory license to do for direct broadcast satellite
(DBS) operators the same thing as § 111 did for cable
systems. Although the systems vary in significant ways
(for example, § 119 bases the fees upon a certain price
per subscriber, instead of a percentage of gross revenues),
the lesson for other compulsory licenses is the same.
A compulsory license can work, but it is not simple
and may require an administratively burdensome set of
regulations.
The treatment of other evolving retransmission
systems, such as systems delivered over fiber-optic
phone cables, is under review. A 1997 Copyright Office
Report favored extending a compulsory license to cover
telephone companies that retransmit broadcast signals.48
This may yet become a real issue in the future, if the
major local telephone companies are able to implement
fiber-to-the-premises broadband service, such as Verizon’s
FIOS and AT&T’s Lightspeed.
The public broadcasting or noncommercial
broadcasting license fees set up pursuant to § 118 of the
Copyright Act49 should be considered sui generis. Under
that section, fees have been set for the performance of
musical compositions (providing lump-sum payments of
several million dollars to ASCAP and BMI by PBS and
NPR, and a few hundred dollars by college or university
public broadcasting entities) and for pictorial, graphic, and
sculptural works (generally in the tens of dollars per use).
In 1999, Congress added § 122 to the Copyright
Act.50 It granted satellite carriers the right to retransmit
broadcast signals within the intended local market of a
television broadcast station, ostensibly putting them more
on a par with cable operators. The license is royalty-free,
on the assumption that the original broadcaster benefits by
reaching viewers in its service area. As such, the provision
is more an exemption from copyright liability than a traditional compulsory licensing system. The primary feature is
that the satellite carrier must provide a list identifying all
subscribers to whom the satellite carrier retransmits.
Even as it has held open the possibility of extending
compulsory licenses in the context of cable and telephone

December

2007

communications, the Copyright Office has voiced
skepticism about compulsory licensing systems on the
Internet. As concluded by the Copyright Office:
[I]t would be inappropriate for Congress to grant
Internet retransmitters the benefits of compulsory
licensing. The primary argument against an Internet
compulsory license is the vast technological and
regulatory differences between Internet retransmitters and the cable systems and satellite carriers that
now enjoy compulsory licensing. The instantaneous
worldwide dissemination of broadcast signals via the
Internet poses major issues regarding the national
and international licensing of the signals that have
not been fully addressed by federal and international policymakers, and it would be premature for
Congress to legislate a copyright compulsory license
to benefit Internet retransmitters.51
OT H E R C O N S I D E R AT I O N S
In considering the treatment of new technologies
within the overall framework of copyright, it is important to remember that copyright is not necessarily, or
even principally, a barrier to the dissemination of creative works. As stated by the Supreme Court in Harper
& Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises:52 “it should
not be forgotten that the Framers intended copyright
itself to be the engine of free expression. By establishing a marketable right to the use of one’s expression,
copyright supplies the economic incentive to create and
disseminate ideas . . .”
For example, ASCAP, perhaps the best existing
model for a collective rights organization, was not created by a compulsory license set by Congress, but resulted
from collective bargaining among the various parties,
with periodic oversight by the courts through the lens
of antitrust law,53 and periodic adjustments of rights by
Congress (as in the so-called Fairness in Music Licensing
Act of 199854).
An initial determination that a use is covered by
copyright gives a copyright owner considerable leverage
in setting the fees for distribution or performance of such
works, of course, but the copyright owner makes no money
if there are no distributions. An initial determination that
copyright does not extend to a particular use, such as in
the case of jukeboxes, cable, or the Betamax, will shift the
bargaining power in favor of the users in any later consideration of a compulsory license.
On the other hand, a compulsory license is not the
only means of placing limitations upon the rights of copyright owners. There are dozens of specific exceptions and
limitations to the rights of copyright, including several in
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§ 11055 (covering certain nonprofit uses), and limitations
resulting from basic principles of copyright, such as fair
use, the idea-expression distinction, and the limitations
upon copyright in works of utility. Many socially beneficial uses of copyrighted works on the Internet, even by
people not owning the copyright, will be protected by
these doctrines.
Although much maligned in the Internet community, the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA)56
gives owners of works the right to control their works
through copy-protection systems and the use of copy
management information systems. Anyone seriously considering a compulsory license will have to work through
the interplay between such a license and the workings of
the DMCA.
For example, would the existence of a compulsory
license to disseminate works on the Internet trump the
DMCA? Presumably not, unless we essentially want to
dismantle the DMCA and require that copyright owners
unlock their copyright protection systems. If the existence
of a compulsory license lessened the economic value of
copyrighted works, particularly those initially supplied in
digital form, the net effect of a compulsory license might
be to convince many copyright owners to adopt more
technically intrusive copy protection systems, a result that
would presumably undermine the whole purpose behind
such a compulsory license.
One also must keep in mind the increasing international role in deciding copyright policy. Take, for example, the proposed Public Domain Enhancement Act,57
introduced in Congress in 2003, which would impose
a maintenance fee for continuing copyright beyond 50
years from first publication. Whatever the merits of such
a requirement, it seems to fly directly in the face of the
Berne Convention,58 which prohibits such formalities as
a limitation on copyright. It was only in 1988 that the
United States finally did away with the requirement of
copyright notice and registration, as a condition to joining
Berne in the first place.59
Another recent international development of considerable relevance is the updating of the General Agreement
on Tariffs and Trade to include intellectual property rights,
under the new structure of the World Trade Organization
(WTO). In a recent decision,60 a WTO panel held the
US exemption of certain restaurants and business establishments for retransmission of musical works received
over the airwaves (§ 110(5)) to be in violation of Berne
obligations. The panel disapproved of national exceptions
or limitations that “conflict with a normal exploitation of
the work.” It is quite possible that too broad a compulsory
license also would be in violation of Berne obligations,
triggering possible retaliatory sanctions in the WTO.
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CONCLUSION
This discussion is not intended to preempt or forestall
consideration of a new compulsory licensing system to
balance competing interests in the emerging peer-to-peer
environment. But the track record of prior compulsory
licenses, the differences between those licenses and a peerto-peer license, and other copyright as well as international considerations suggest that caution is in order before
jumping headlong into any quick fix.
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